[Historical Documents]
Xiaoping’s Three Letters, Self-Criticism, and Original Text of Self-Account
Note on Context: These documents reflect the specific political terminology and ideological climate of the Cultural Revolution era in China. The language used is specific to that historical period.
Deng Xiaoping · 2026-01-20 · Source: Yan'an Individual and Private Enterprises Association Official Account
These articles are not included in the "Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping," and they appear quite interesting when viewed today. In particular, they intuitively present to the world and to history a flexible and changing image of the real man—as for which side is the true one? Fortunately, having heard his words, future generations can truly observe his actions.
I. Deng Xiaoping’s Letter to Hua Guofeng (October 1976)
To Comrade Dongxing, to be presented to Comrade Guofeng and the Central Committee:
I wholeheartedly support the Central Committee’s decision to have Comrade Hua Guofeng assume the positions of Chairman of the Party Central Committee and Chairman of the Military Commission. I hail the great significance of this extremely important decision for the Party and the cause of socialism. Not only is Comrade Hua Guofeng the most suitable successor to Chairman Mao politically and ideologically, but in terms of age, he can ensure the stability of the proletarian leadership for at least fifteen or twenty years. How important this is for the whole Party, the whole Army, and the people of the whole country! How could this not make one rejoice and feel inspired?
The recent struggle against the careerists and conspirators who sought to usurp Party and state power occurred at a critical moment immediately following the passing of the Great Leader Chairman Mao. The Party Central Committee headed by Comrade Guofeng defeated this gang of scoundrels and won a great victory. This is a victory of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie; it is a victory of the socialist road over the capitalist road; it is a victory for consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat and preventing capitalist restoration; it is a victory for consolidating the great cause of the Party; it is a victory for Mao Zedong Thought and Chairman Mao’s revolutionary line.
Like the people of the whole country, I feel an infinite joy from the bottom of my heart regarding the victory of this great struggle, and I cannot help but shout: Long live, long live, long, long live! I use this short letter to express my sincere inner feelings.
Long live the Party Central Committee headed by Chairman Hua!
Long live the great victory of the Party and the socialist cause!
Deng Xiaoping
October 10, 1976
II. Deng Xiaoping’s Letter to Hua Guofeng and Ye Jianying (April 1977)
Chairman Hua, Vice Chairman Ye, and the Party Central Committee:
I fully support Chairman Hua’s recent speech at the Central Working Conference, and I fully support Chairman Hua’s policy of "grasping the key link in running the country" and the deployment of work regarding current various issues.
Although I did some beneficial things during my work in 1975, I indeed had shortcomings and mistakes. I once again express my sincere acceptance of the criticism and teachings given to me by the Great Leader and Mentor Chairman Mao.
I thank the Party Central Committee for clarifying that I had no connection to the Gang of Four. I am particularly pleased that Chairman Hua’s speech affirmed that the activities of the broad masses of the people at Tiananmen Square during the Qingming Festival last year were reasonable.
As for the question of my personal work—what to do and when it is appropriate to start working—I completely obey the consideration and arrangements of the Central Committee.
At the time of the Great Leader Chairman Mao’s passing, I expressed my inner grief and deep mourning to the Central Committee in writing. We must, for generations to come, use accurate and complete Mao Zedong Thought to guide our whole Party, whole Army, and the people of the whole country, pushing the cause of the Party and socialism, and the cause of international communism, triumphantly forward.
When the Party Central Committee decided that Comrade Hua Guofeng should serve as Chairman of the Party Central Committee and Chairman of the Military Commission, and when I learned of the great victory of the Party Central Committee headed by Hua Guofeng in defeating the Gang of Four in the most wise, decisive, and correct manner, I expressed my sincere support and feelings of joy to Comrade Guofeng and the Central Committee in writing on October 10, 1976.
If the Central Committee deems it appropriate, I suggest that this letter, along with my letter from October 10 of last year, be printed and distributed within the Party. As for how this should be handled, I completely obey the Central Committee’s consideration and decision.
With sincere salutations!
Deng Xiaoping
April 10, 1977
III. Deng Xiaoping’s Letter to Mao Zedong (August 1972)
Chairman:
The day before yesterday (August 1st), for the fourth time, I listened together with all the staff to the evidence of the crimes of the Lin Biao anti-Party counter-revolutionary clique’s conspiracy and rebellion, and the historical materials regarding Chen Boda, the anti-communist element, Trotskyite, traitor, spy, and revisionist. This made me feel even more strongly that if it were not for the Great Cultural Revolution and the incomparably massive "monster-revealing mirror" of the broad and deep mass movement that so rapidly revealed the true forms of this gang of monsters and demons; and specifically, if it were not for the Chairman, who from their worldviews and their political views and conspiratorial activities timely detected their reactionary essence and extreme harmfulness and rapidly exposed them to the light of day; if they had once fully grasped the supreme power of the Party and the State, not only would our socialist motherland have turned back to capitalist restoration, but our country would have been plunged back into a semi-colonial status, and who knows how many heads would have rolled.
Undoubtedly, at that time, the revolutionary people and true Communists would eventually have risen up to overthrow them and restore the dictatorship of the proletariat and the socialist system, but how many long and painful historical reversals would that have required! Thinking of this, I truly shudder with fear. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, after overthrowing Liu Shaoqi’s counter-revolutionary bourgeois headquarters, has now overthrown the counter-revolutionary clique of Lin Biao and Chen Boda, once again eliminating the greatest danger for the Party and the State. I cannot help but cheer for the great victory of the Cultural Revolution and the great victory of Mao Zedong Thought.
Regarding Lin Biao and Chen Boda, I have no important materials to reveal; in particular, I know nothing of their history. I can only recall my usual feelings about them. Regarding Lin Biao, I used to think he was good at fighting battles. I do not believe in "ever-victorious generals"—there is no general who does not suffer defeats, and in fact, he did not win every battle—but I considered him to be a capable military man after all. I also felt his taciturn nature was a strength. Historically, I knew he committed two errors. One was during the Long March when he got together with Peng Dehuai to oppose Chairman Mao’s leadership. He always boasted that he opposed Peng Dehuai, but at such a difficult juncture, he formed an alliance with Peng Dehuai and engaged in secret liaisons. If not for the Chairman’s prestige and strong leadership, who knows what the situation would have become?
The second time was the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea. This was also a serious political juncture. He again came forward to oppose the Chairman’s extremely important political decision and refused to go to Korea to fight. By rights, he was a more appropriate candidate than Peng Dehuai, yet he refused. In essence, he was afraid of the United States; he did not believe that US Imperialism could be defeated, and he did not believe in his own righteous stance and his own strength. Regarding these two matters, it was only at the 11th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee, in the atmosphere of everyone’s self-criticism, that he lightly mentioned them.
After the liberation of the whole country, I gradually felt from some events that he was a person who harbored jealousy and was not very tolerant of others. I saw this in his attitude towards Comrades Luo Ronghuan and Liu Bocheng. Comrade Liu Bocheng had shortcomings and errors in his teaching guidelines at the Military Academy, and criticism was necessary. However, Lin Biao, together with Peng Dehuai, criticized Liu not with good intentions. Lin’s speech at the enlarged meeting of the Military Commission was particularly harsh in voice and countenance. They even said Liu played no role in the Second Field Army, as if only I played a role there. At the time, I said that without a Commander who could cooperate so well, I as Political Commissar could not have played any role either (I remember saying this in the Standing Committee as well). Lin Biao was naturally unhappy with my attitude.
Comrade Luo Ronghuan was an old comrade-in-arms of Lin Biao; by rights, they should have been on good terms. Comrade Luo Ronghuan’s simplicity, sincerity, and kindness were known to everyone, and Luo had great prestige among the cadres. Lin Biao said that when Fourth Field Army cadres had issues, they went to Luo, not to him. I cannot remember if it was in the 1950s, but Comrade Luo Ronghuan once pointed out that Lin Biao, in propagating Mao Zedong Thought, only emphasized the "Three Old Articles," which was vulgarizing Mao Zedong Thought. Lin Biao was very unhappy, and from then on his relationship with Luo was very bad. As for his relationship with He Long, everyone knows about that.
Regarding the handling of the Luo Ruiqing issue, I was in error. Before the Luo Ruiqing issue emerged, I always thought the relationship between Luo Ruiqing and Lin Biao could not be bad. I always felt Luo was Lin’s old subordinate, and Luo becoming Chief of Staff was recommended by Lin, so there should be no problem. Therefore, when Lin Biao raised the Luo Ruiqing issue in early 1966 (December 1965), and the nature of it was so serious, my feeling was one of suddenness. And when Ye Qun described to me how Luo Ruiqing opposed Lin Biao and attempted to seize power, she also interspersed some words about how Luo slighted me. I did not feel comfortable hearing this; I always felt it contained some personal elements, and the manner had somewhat of a surprise attack nature. This somewhat influenced me to commit that unforgivable error in handling Luo’s problem.
Regarding Lin Biao holding high the great red banner of Mao Zedong Thought, it now appears that he was indeed "waving the red flag to oppose the red flag," a step in preparing to seize power, subvert the dictatorship of the proletariat, and restore capitalism. However, in the past, I always thought he grasped it correctly and well, much better than I did. One of my greatest past errors was not holding high the great red banner of Mao Zedong Thought. However, in the past, I consistently disagreed on two points. One was Lin Biao emphasizing only the "Three Old Articles," saying many times that the "Three Old Articles" were enough. I believed that Mao Zedong Thought developed Marxism-Leninism comprehensively in all fields; to speak only of the "Three Old Articles" and not expound and apply Mao Zedong Thought from all fields is tantamount to belittling Mao Zedong Thought and vulgarizing it. The second was that I always felt Lin Biao’s formulation severed Mao Zedong Thought from Marxism-Leninism. This also belittled the significance of Mao Zedong Thought, particularly damaging the role of Mao Zedong Thought in the international communist movement and the movement against international revisionism. I understood this from the attitude of the Albanian comrades. I am in favor of emphasizing the role of Mao Zedong Thought in inheriting, defending, and developing Marxism-Leninism.
Regarding army building, I had always affirmed Lin Biao’s role in this area in the past. I only felt that while emphasizing the human factor, he neglected military technology and tactical training. Lin Biao said many times that as long as people are not afraid of death, they will win battles. This is correct, but also one-sided. During the Cultural Revolution, when I saw the formulation "founded by Chairman Mao and directly commanded by Vice Chairman Lin," I felt it was a bit glaring. I only thought it was a formulation to raise Lin Biao’s prestige and dared not have other thoughts. Now that his true form is revealed, I have suddenly seen the light.
As for Chen Boda, I knew nothing of his history, not even that he wrote the Outline of the Three People's Principles in Yan'an. My impression of Chen was that this person was very conceited, very hypocritical, and never made self-criticisms. He could write, but I never heard him praise good things written by others. He was jealous of others who could write, for example, Hu Qiaomu. His frequent catchphrase was: "I am a scholar, I am no good." This was his only self-criticism. He looked down on articles or documents he did not participate in. If he put forward an incorrect opinion that was later criticized, he would simply stop saying it; I never heard him admit he was wrong on that matter. For example, he said the "70 Articles for Industry" were bad, but exactly which parts did he disagree with? I never heard him say. I only knew he proposed two ideas in industry: one was to create trusts, and the other was to implement piece-rate wages. We experimented with trusts; this meant greater industrial concentration, which had a great contradiction with the policy of bringing local initiative into play. Implementing piece-rate wages (he specially compiled investigation materials in Tianjin for this) meant further engaging in material incentives, which is definitely not as good as the system combining time-based wages with piece-rate wages. Later, he stopped talking about these two things. Because he said the "70 Articles" were bad, the Central Committee designated him to be responsible for revising them. Later, I asked him about it several times, but he delayed and never did it. I don't know what tricks he was up to. When writing a batch of articles criticizing Soviet revisionism, because they were written by the team under Comrade Kang Sheng, Chen Boda had no interest in participating. Only when the "25 Articles" on the International Communist Movement were being drafted, because he was designated to preside over the revision, did he become active. In short, there were many such things, only I cannot remember the details. Chen Boda had not presided over any work for many years. One usually has to be more forgiving toward a pen-pusher like him, so my impression of him was just average. As for his actions while presiding over the Cultural Revolution, especially the events of the Second Plenary Session of the 9th Central Committee, I only learned that he was such a scoundrel after listening to the transmission of Central Committee documents. His past manifestations were not strange.
The Chairman knows that Lin Biao and Chen Boda wanted to put me to death. If not for the Chairman’s protection, I do not know what I would have become.
Together with the whole Party and the people of the whole country, I enthusiastically celebrate the great victory of destroying the Lin Biao anti-Party counter-revolutionary clique after destroying Liu Shaoqi’s counter-revolutionary bourgeois headquarters!
Regarding myself, my errors and crimes were reviewed in my "Self-Account" written in June and July of 1968, based on what I realized at the time. To this day, I still acknowledge all the content of my self-criticism, and I once again affirm my guarantee to the Central Committee: I will never reverse the verdict.
One of the biggest errors in my history was that I should not have left the Red 7th Army in early 1931. Although this action was legal organizationally, politically it was extremely erroneous.
During the War of Resistance Against Japan and the War of Liberation, I basically implemented Chairman Mao’s correct line, though naturally, I committed some individual errors.
Another of my biggest errors was that after arriving to work in Beijing, especially after I served as General Secretary of the Party Central Committee, I committed a series of errors, developing to the point of implementing a counter-revolutionary bourgeois reactionary line together with Liu Shaoqi. I did the work of the General Secretary very poorly; I did not seek instructions or report to the Chairman timely and frequently, committing the error of running an "independent kingdom." During the difficult period of 1960 and 1961, I did not resist the capitalist unhealthy trends of "San Zi Yi Bao" (Three freedoms and one contract) and "Four Big Freedoms." I did not follow the Chairman’s instructions to grasp the basic construction of the Third Front, causing projects that should not have been stopped to be stopped, delaying the Third Front construction which has very significant strategic meaning. In terms of industrial construction, the "70 Articles for Industry" I presided over did not put politics in command and did not take the Chairman’s "Constitution of the Anshan Iron and Steel Company" as the pointer, and thus was an erroneous thing. Organizationally, I misjudged and trusted people like Peng Zhen, Luo Ruiqing, and Yang Shangkun. What was particularly grave was that for a long time I did not hold high the great red banner of Mao Zedong Thought. It is entirely appropriate for the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution to expose and criticize me; for me personally, it is also a salvation. I fully support the Chairman’s words: The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is completely necessary and very timely.
I committed many errors, which I confessed in my "Self-Account," so I will not list them one by one here. The root of my errors is that my bourgeois worldview was not fundamentally transformed, resulting in detachment from the masses and reality.
In the letter I submitted to the Chairman in November of last year (1971), I made a request for work. My understanding is this: After committing errors, I have been completely detached from work and social contact for over five years, nearly six. I always want an opportunity to correct my errors through work and return to the Chairman’s proletarian revolutionary line. I fully know that a person like me, who has committed great errors and crimes and has been thoroughly criticized in society, cannot be trusted by the masses again and cannot do any important work again. However, I feel my health is still good; although I am 68 years old, I can still do some technical work (such as investigation and research work) and can still work for the Party and the people for seven or eight years, to make up for my faults by one ten-thousandth. I have no other requests; I await the instructions of the Chairman and the Central Committee.
I wholeheartedly wish the Chairman a long, long life!
Deng Xiaoping
August 3, 1972
(This letter was delivered to Mao Zedong by Deng Xiaoping via Jiang Qing)
IV. Self-Criticism at the CPC Central Working Conference
Deng Xiaoping
(October 23, 1966)
I fully support the instructions given by the Chairman and Comrade Lin Biao during the conference, and I fully agree with Comrade Chen Boda’s speech on October 16. This conference deeply examines the Party’s guidelines and policies in the Cultural Revolution movement, to further eliminate the influence of the bourgeois erroneous line represented by Comrade Liu Shaoqi and myself, and to better implement the 11th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee’s "Decision Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution." Implementing the correct line of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution personally formulated and led by Chairman Mao is extremely important.
It can now be seen more clearly that in this great, unprecedented Cultural Revolution movement, just as in all important stages of revolutionary movements in the past, there has consistently been a sharp struggle between two classes and two lines: the struggle between the correct proletarian line represented by Chairman Mao and the reactionary erroneous line representing the bourgeoisie. In this Cultural Revolution, the representatives of the bourgeois reactionary erroneous line—among the leading comrades of the Central Committee and within the scope of the whole Party—are Comrade Shaoqi and myself. In order to implement the resolution of the 11th Plenary Session and Chairman Mao’s correct line, and to carry the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution through to the end, we must thoroughly criticize the errors committed by the two of us and eliminate the influence of the erroneous line represented by us. Because the two of us bear complete responsibility not only for the period before the 11th Plenary Session but also direct responsibility for the influence of the erroneous line represented by us in various places and departments after the 11th Plenary Session.
During the 11th Plenary Session, Chairman Mao’s big-character poster bombarded the headquarters of Comrade Liu Shaoqi and myself. In this big-character poster, Chairman Mao hit the nail on the head by pointing out the nature of the errors we committed: "Standing on a reactionary bourgeois standpoint, exercising a bourgeois dictatorship, suppressing the vigorous movement of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, reversing right and wrong, confusing black and white, encircling and suppressing revolutionaries, suppressing different opinions, imposing white terror, acting very pleased with yourselves, boosting the arrogance of the bourgeoisie and crushing the spirit of the proletariat—how vicious this is!" Chairman Mao’s shot was very accurate and hit my vital point.
During the fifty-plus days of errors, due to the dispatching of work teams, the result actually acted to suppress the Left, strike at the Left, suppress different opinions, and strangle the vigorous mass movement of the Cultural Revolution that had just arisen. It made the movement dreary and cold, causing widespread phenomena of students fighting students and masses fighting masses, guiding the movement onto an evil road. This situation of mass antagonism was mainly the result of dispatching work teams, and it was difficult to reverse even after the work teams were withdrawn. Especially after the 11th Plenary Session, the errors we committed continued to have a very bad influence nationwide, showing the seriousness of the consequences. This shows that the error we committed was not a simple error, but an error of direction, an error of line.
The situation at the time was that after the revolutionary teachers, students, and staff of universities and middle schools in Beijing universally rose up, directly targeting the bourgeois power-holders, many school Party committees and leaders suppressed the revolutionary masses and were criticized and overthrown. At that time, we treated dispatching work teams as a panacea and dispatched them universally to universities and middle schools. In some schools, the work teams were very large. Once the work teams went in, they took over the leadership positions of the Party and administration. Furthermore, they universally used methods criticized by the Chairman during the "Four Clean-ups" movement in rural areas or factories, and some even used erroneous old ways of thinking to work. Effectively, this let the work teams control the mass movement, treating the masses as "Adou" (useless fools) and the work teams as "Zhuge Liang" (wise masters). The result strangled the vigorous mass movement that had already arisen, universally causing strikes against the Left and students fighting students, and instead relaxing or even abandoning the main tasks of the Cultural Revolution: "One Struggle, Two Criticisms, Three Reforms."
What is particularly serious is that by mid-June, the aforementioned serious phenomena had already clearly manifested and should have been corrected in time. At the time, Comrade Chen Boda and others correctly analyzed the situation of the movement at a Central meeting and repeatedly proposed withdrawing the work teams and letting the masses make revolution themselves. However, we stubbornly refused this correct proposal regarding the general direction of guiding the movement, repeatedly insisting on keeping the work teams, prolonging this for over fifty days, resulting in the development of a line error. Because we committed a line error, many comrades in the work teams encountered great difficulties and followed in committing some shortcomings and errors. Therefore, it must be clarified that the vast majority of work team members are good comrades. The responsibility for the errors committed during this period, except for individuals, should not be borne by them, but by me and Comrade Liu Shaoqi. Many work team comrades feel wronged, and many comrades indeed suffered grievances; specifically, due to the influence of our errors, comrades in some departments and places committed errors of varying degrees. For this, I feel extremely ashamed and apologetic.
Due to the dispatching of work teams, serious antagonism toward the work teams arose among the student masses. Many teachers, students, and staff supported the work teams, or both supported and criticized them. Some, under the guidance of our erroneous thinking, even raised the extremely erroneous slogan: "Opposing the work team is opposing the Party Central Committee and Chairman Mao." However, the vast majority of these teachers, students, and staff are revolutionary and actively support and participate in the Cultural Revolution. They cannot be blamed, and they cannot be called royalists. The true royalists, in name and reality, are mainly myself and Comrade Shaoqi.
During the two-plus months of the movement in Beijing, the ones mainly presiding over work in the Standing Committee of the Central Committee were Comrade Shaoqi and myself; Chairman Mao was not in Beijing at the time. Shortly after dispatching the work teams, the situation of suppressing and striking the Left, masses fighting masses, and masses opposing work teams arose. As mentioned before, in mid-June, among the Central comrades, those represented by Comrade Chen Boda proposed the correct opinion of withdrawing the work teams. But we would not listen. On the other hand, we were very willing to listen to and actively supported erroneous situations and erroneous assertions that fit our own subjective needs. The correct opinions of Comrade Chen Boda and others came from the masses, conformed to Chairman Mao’s mass line, followed the Chairman’s thinking closely, and grasped the mainstream of the movement. We, however, detached ourselves from the Chairman’s thinking, had an erroneous understanding of the movement’s mainstream, and acted completely contrary to Chairman Mao’s mass line, being completely subjectivist and bureaucratic. What is particularly serious is that regarding important situations in the movement and differing opinions on guiding the movement, we did not report to Chairman Mao in time to seek instructions, causing this error to prolong for over fifty days and develop into a line error, causing serious damage to the movement.
It can be stated with certainty that if we had been a bit more humble at the time, good at listening to different opinions, and especially if we had submitted reports and requests for instructions to the Chairman at any time, we would certainly have received the Chairman’s instructions and help, and the error could have been corrected in time. Because the Chairman had long held the opinion of dispatching fewer or no work teams. We did not comprehend this instruction, and instead violated the Chairman’s instruction, acting in the opposite way. Naturally, we could only commit serious errors and be unable to extricate ourselves.
In this Cultural Revolution, I committed an error of direction and line. Of course, this is not just a problem of dispatching work teams; dispatching work teams was merely one form of expression of the error. The essence of the error I committed is: on the issue of the mass line, I did not stand on the side of trusting the masses and supporting the masses’ revolution, but stood on the side opposing the masses’ revolution; on the issue of class struggle, I did not stand on the side of the revolutionary proletariat. In short, this serious erroneous line completely violates Comrade Mao Zedong’s guiding principles.
The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was personally proposed and led by our Great Leader Chairman Mao. As the 11th Plenary Session pointed out, this "is a great revolution that touches people’s souls and constitutes a new stage in the development of the socialist revolution in our country, a deeper and more extensive stage." The purpose of this great revolution lies not only in achieving the tasks of "One Struggle, Two Criticisms, Three Reforms" in universities and middle schools, but its deeper significance lies in "dealing a head-on blow to all challenges of the bourgeoisie in the ideological sphere, using the proletariat’s own new ideas, new culture, new customs, and new habits to change the spiritual outlook of the entire society." "Criticize the ideology of the bourgeoisie and exploiting classes, reform education, reform literature and art, and reform all parts of the superstructure not in correspondence with the socialist economic base, so as to facilitate the consolidation and development of the socialist system."
This is a great revolutionary movement to foster the proletarian and extinguish the bourgeois, guaranteeing that our country will never change color and avoiding the danger of revisionism and capitalist restoration. This is a great feat of the world proletarian revolution. For such a great revolutionary movement, if we do not follow Chairman Mao’s teachings, if we put "fear" above "daring," if we do not infinitely trust the masses, fully mobilize the masses, and rely on the broadest revolutionary teachers, students, staff, revolutionary workers and peasants, and revolutionary cadres to carry out this revolution with their own hands, letting the masses educate themselves and liberate themselves in the great storms and waves, it is impossible to achieve the goal. The great task of destroying the Four Olds and establishing the Four News can only be realized by relying on their revolutionary enthusiasm and wisdom, because only they are familiar with the situation and possess such talent and ability. People like us neither understand the situation nor have this ability.
Originally, after the movement arose in Beijing universities and middle schools, the situation was excellent. The masses rose up universally, attacking all monsters and demons and attacking the bourgeois power-holders within the Party. The big-character poster by Nie Yuanzi and six other comrades played the role of a great call, like the Paris Commune of Beijing. At the time, it looked a bit "chaotic." This was the "chaos" of rebelling against monsters and demons; it was "chaos" that was very good. But what about us? We saw this "very good" as "terrible," were scared witless by the so-called "chaos," put fear first, prescribed medicine randomly, and rushed to let work teams control the movement. In the name of strengthening leadership, we actually played a destructive role in strangling the movement. The result was turning a vigorous movement into something cold and dreary, pitting masses against masses, striking the Left, and making the monsters and demons secretly happy. Chairman Mao said this was implementing white terror, boosting the ambition of the bourgeoisie, and destroying the prestige of the proletariat—this is not an unjust accusation at all.
It is now very clear that once our errors were corrected by the Chairman and the Central Committee, a very broad and large-scale mass movement appeared. Red Guards, such distinct revolutionary combat organizations, appeared. The revolutionary teachers, students, and staff, with majestic momentum, expanded from schools to society, from local areas to other places, attacking all monsters and demons with the force of a thunderbolt, destroying the Four Olds and establishing the Four News. The battle results are brilliant and they have performed immortal feats. Undoubtedly, this has epoch-making and extremely profound significance for educating and tempering the younger generation, guiding the revolutionization of the people of the whole country, and guaranteeing that our country does not change color—not only for China but for the whole world. The panic of the imperialists, revisionists, and reactionaries regarding our Cultural Revolution proves that under the brilliant illumination of Mao Zedong Thought, the Cultural Revolution personally led by Chairman Mao is completely and utterly right. And we, occupying high positions of Central leadership, did not learn well or comprehend Chairman Mao’s strategic thinking and mass line. In our own work, we did not understand Chairman Mao’s strategic thinking, did not trust the masses, and instead suppressed the revolutionary masses, damaging the great mass movement of the Cultural Revolution. This was not only failing to hold up the red flag of Mao Zedong Thought, but directly violating Chairman Mao’s teachings and violating Mao Zedong Thought.
My committing such a serious line error this time was naturally not accidental; it has ideological roots and roots in style of work. Ideologically, the most fundamental point is that for a long time, I not only did not hold high, but can simply be said to have not held up the great red banner of Mao Zedong Thought. By rights, my post was close to Chairman Mao, and I could frequently hear Chairman Mao’s teachings and instructions. But I was the worst at learning Mao Zedong Thought, did the least propaganda for it, and applied it most rigidly. Mao Zedong Thought is the soul of all our work. How much one grasps Mao Zedong Thought is the standard for distinguishing how much Marxism-Leninism and proletarian ideology one actually has. If one does not advance, one retreats. Since I learned very poorly, non-proletarian things increased, and I inevitably derailed from Mao Zedong Thought on this or that issue, committing this or that error, developing all the way to committing the error of a Right opportunist line this time. This was inevitable.
Looking back, in these years, my ideology and work have been regressing. Because I did not study hard and did not follow the Chairman’s thinking well, I committed quite a few errors. The work of the Central Secretariat, which I presided over, was done very poorly, and the Central departments directly under the Secretariat also had the most problems. On the issue of treating class struggle and the issue of treating inner-Party struggle, my thinking was biased to the Right. I had a share in the Rightist errors of 1962 mentioned in Chairman Mao’s big-character poster bombarding the headquarters. Regarding the error of being "Left in form but Right in essence" in 1964, although I had some different opinions, they were not completely in line with Mao Zedong Thought either, nor was I standing completely on the side of Chairman Mao’s correct line. As for before 1962, there were also quite a few errors. I should use this opportunity to seriously examine and clear them up.
Not following the Chairman well and being very poor at learning Mao Zedong Thought is closely linked to my style of being seriously detached from the masses and reality. For a long time, I sat high above, acting as an official and a lord, going down rarely, contacting the masses rarely, contacting cadres rarely, and contacting responsible comrades rarely. I was not diligent enough in my work, did not seriously conduct investigation and research among the masses, and my methods for solving daily problems were very simple, sometimes very harsh. This could only place me in a very blocked-off position, developing subjectivism and bureaucratism. Thus, in my thinking and work, I unavoidably and often committed serious errors, often derailed from Mao Zedong Thought, and inevitably developed to the point of conflicting with Mao Zedong Thought. And I myself was unconscious of this for a long time, generating and developing emotions of arrogance, complacency, and self-righteousness. As a result, I often handled matters insufficiently seriously, rarely asked for advice from comrades or the masses, and especially rarely made reports seeking instructions from the Chairman. This is not only an important cause of errors but is also impermissible in terms of organizational discipline.
At the end of 1964, Chairman Mao criticized me as an "independent kingdom." This serious criticism shocked me, but I comforted myself by thinking I was not a person who seized power, and I did not find the root of the illness. My erroneous thinking and erroneous style were not corrected. Committing a line error this time was naturally inevitable; if not this time, it would inevitably happen later. In short, my thinking and style are incompatible with Mao Zedong Thought. Not holding high the great red banner of Mao Zedong Thought and not following Chairman Mao closely severely detached me from leadership, and coupled with severe detachment from the masses and reality, it completely exposed me as not being a good student of Chairman Mao, and as someone completely unsuitable to hold important leadership work.
Committing this line error is a great self-exposure, proving that I am a petty bourgeois intellectual who has not been remolded well, a person whose bourgeois worldview has not been remolded, a person who has not passed the test of socialism. Now, looking at myself in the mirror primarily, I truly shudder with fear. With my current ideological style and political level, holding Central leadership work is detrimental to the cause of the Party and the people. I should deeply reflect, strive to study Chairman Mao’s works, strive to remold myself, strive to correct my errors, and maintain my integrity in my later years, striving to do a little something beneficial for the Party and the people to make up for my faults by one ten-thousandth. I have this confidence that with my own active efforts and the active help of comrades, my errors will be corrected within a considerable period. Under the brilliant illumination of Mao Zedong Thought, having fallen down, I should strive to stand up myself.
The 11th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee confirmed Comrade Lin Biao as the Chairman’s assistant and successor and selected a number of comrades who hold high the red flag of Mao Zedong Thought to major Central posts. These are very necessary and very important measures, possessing extremely major significance for our country and the world. I express my heartfelt support. Comrade Lin Biao is a model for us to learn from. It is precisely he who holds the red flag of Mao Zedong Thought the highest, learns it the best, and applies it the most vividly. It is precisely he who is good at "eating through both ends" (understanding both the top leadership and the grassroots), reporting to the Chairman promptly on major issues. He understands the Chairman’s thinking and intentions best, and also understands the situation of the masses and the lower levels best. Therefore, his ideological level and leadership level are very high, and he has become Chairman Mao’s closest comrade-in-arms. The People’s Liberation Army led by him has become a model for the whole country to learn from. For a person like me who has committed errors, I should honestly learn from Comrade Lin Biao, learn from his holding high the red flag of Mao Zedong Thought, and learn from his living study and living application of Chairman Mao’s works. This is the only reliable path for me to correct my errors and strive to do some work beneficial to the Party and the people.
My above self-criticism is naturally only preliminary and not profound. I hope to receive criticism and correction from comrades.
Long live the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution!
Long live the great, invincible Mao Zedong Thought!
Long live the Great Mentor, Great Helmsman, Great Leader Chairman Mao!
V. My Self-Account (Excerpt)
Deng Xiaoping
(Written between June 20 and July 5, 1968. Comrade Deng Xiaoping wrote "My Self-Account" to the Central Committee, totaling about 30,000 words. In this material, he relatively comprehensively narrated his political history and work experience and examined his errors. The following is an excerpt from that self-account.)
In the summer of 1929, after the war between Chiang Kai-shek and the Guangxi clique, Yu Zuobo became the Chairman of the Guangxi Provincial Government, and Li Mingrui became the Director of the Guangxi Pacification Office. Yu tried hard to appear progressive and requested our Party to send cadres to work in his troops. The Party Central Committee sent me as the Central representative to contact Yu. After about a month in Nanning, the situation changed suddenly. We decided to stage the Nanning Uprising, reported it to the Central Committee, and received approval. One day in September, we led the Fourth and Fifth Brigades and part of the training regiment to stage a revolutionary mutiny. The Fourth Brigade, led by Comrade Zhang Yunyi, marched to Baise; I went with the Fourth Brigade. The Fifth Brigade, led by Comrade Yu Zuoyu, marched to Longzhou; Li Mingrui moved with the Fifth Brigade. Later, the Red 7th Army was established based on the Fourth Brigade, and the Red 8th Army was established based on the Fifth Brigade.
The Youjiang region in Guangxi was an area with a relatively good mass base. There was an excellent peasant mass leader of great prestige like Comrade Wei Baqun. The Donglan and Fengshan areas were where Comrade Wei Baqun had worked for a long time and were very good revolutionary base areas. This gave great convenience to the establishment and activities of the Red 7th Army. Once we arrived in Baise, we prepared to raise the red flag and decided to revolt on November 7, 1929. On the eve of the uprising, in late October, I suddenly received a telegram from the Shanghai Central Committee asking me to report on work. After making arrangements with Comrade Zhang Yunyi and others, I left Baise for Longzhou in early November. After arriving in Longzhou, I did some work with Li Mingrui and Yu Zuoyu and held a meeting of Party cadres. Everyone agreed to raise the red flag and establish the Red 8th Army. After making arrangements, I left Longzhou and arrived in Shanghai in early February 1930 to report to the Central Committee. The Central Committee approved our actions and ordered me to return to Guangxi to serve as Political Commissar of the 7th Army and Secretary of the Front Committee, concurrently serving as Political Commissar of the 8th Army.
In March 1930, I returned to the Red 8th Army in Longzhou and conveyed the Central Committee’s instructions to cadres like Li Mingrui and Yu Zuoyu. At the time, the situation in Zuojiang was becoming increasingly difficult. I agreed with them that if they could not maintain a foothold, they could move closer to the 7th Army. Shortly after the Red 8th Army was established, it was attacked by the enemy and lost most of its forces. Yu Zuoyu went to Hong Kong and was later arrested and killed by the Kuomintang. The remaining few hundred men of the Red 8th Army (about half a regiment) were led by Comrade Yuan Zhenwu and others to Youjiang and merged into the 7th Army. The Red 7th Army returned to Youjiang around July or August, and I reunited with Comrade Zhang Yunyi and others.
Around mid-to-late October 1930, a Central representative named Deng Gang (also known as Deng Baqi [?]) suddenly arrived and conveyed the "Li Lisan Line" to us. He spoke largely about the arrival of a nationwide revolutionary high tide and ordered the Red 7th Army to move out immediately. The specific mission was three slogans: "Hit all the way to Liuzhou," "Hit all the way to Guilin," and "Hit all the way to Guangzhou." The whole army was excited upon hearing this. So, in early November, we took an oath and set out eastward with the main force of about 7,000 men, leaving Comrade Wei Baqun and a small local armed force to persist in the Youjiang base area (Wei persisted heroically for many years before being killed by a traitor and gloriously sacrificing himself).
At that time, my state of mind was that hearing about the arrival of the nationwide revolutionary high tide was indeed exciting. But at the same time, I felt that relying on these few thousand men—when we hadn't even taken Baise, and Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi had restored rule in Guangxi—meant there was no certainty in taking Liuzhou or Guilin. However, since it was a Central order, I could only resolutely execute it. Deng Gang also conveyed the Central Committee’s criticism, saying that our land policy in Youjiang (which was the policy of equal distribution of land I had learned from the Red 4th Army’s report while at the Central Committee) was executing a Rightist rich-peasant line. I felt unhappy about this. Regarding the Li Lisan Line, listening to the conveyance by the Central representative, I was indeed excited and did not feel anything was wrong. I only felt that executing the mission of those three big slogans with the 7th Army’s own strength was difficult, and I only raised opinions on specific issues like attacking Liuzhou. At that time, I had absolutely no understanding or awareness of line problems. After some debate, I finally accepted the Li Lisan Line in its entirety. The result caused the Red 7th Army to detach from the Youjiang base area. We also erroneously decided to attack Wugang and engaged in the Meihua battle, causing the troops to suffer great losses. As Secretary of the Front Committee, I must bear the main responsibility for this; it is unshirkable.
Under the influence of the Li Lisan Line, the Red 7th Army fought several battles in a row, and the troops suffered heavy losses. When crossing the Lechang River, the troops were cut off by the enemy. The army headquarters and one regiment led by Comrade Zhang Yunyi lost contact with us. I, along with Li Mingrui, Xu Zhuo, and others, led a vanguard regiment. We broke away from the enemy and continued forward, arriving in Chongyi, Jiangxi, around the end of 1930. From the local Special Committee, we learned that the Central Committee had held the Fourth Plenary Session and Wang Ming and others had come to power. I was shocked inside (I did not discuss this with other comrades; I never had good feelings toward Wang Ming). At the same time, the enemy situation in Chongyi was not serious, so I had the thought of going to Shanghai to report work to the Central Committee. At the time, the Front Committee consisted only of Xu Zhuo, Li Mingrui, and myself. My idea obtained the agreement of Xu and Li, and we agreed that during my absence, Xu Zhuo would act as Secretary of the Front Committee. subsequently, Xu and I left Chongyi city to go to the Special Committee to arrange the work of establishing a base area. Unexpectedly, on the way back to Chongyi, we learned of enemy activity and heard gunshots from the direction of Chongyi. Since the decision for me to go to Shanghai to report work had already been made by the Front Committee, and assuming the troops would transfer and the Special Committee organs would transfer after the enemy came, I discussed with Xu Zhuo that he would return to the troops and, if necessary, move closer to Jinggangshan. I then set off and arrived in Shanghai in early 1931, quickly reporting to the Central Committee.
Regarding the issue of my leaving the Red 7th Army to report to the Central Committee: In 1933, when Bogu’s Central Committee opposed the "Luo Ming Line in Jiangxi," they formally investigated this matter and ordered me to write a written report. In the report, I requested them to inquire with Xu Zhuo, who was then working in the Central Military Commission organs. After that, they did not ask me to write any further reports. Now I realize that at the time, the two separated parts of the troops had not yet reunited, and our foothold was not stable. As the main person in charge, leaving the troops under such circumstances was absolutely something I should not have done; it was a serious political error.
In the Central Soviet Area for More Than Three Years
In August 1931, we arrived in Ruijin. This was exactly the period when the main force of the Red Army was opposing the enemy’s third "encirclement and suppression." Ruijin was the rear of the Central Soviet Area, but at the time, the county’s Party and government leadership had been usurped by counter-revolutionary Social Democratic Party elements. They killed many revolutionary cadres and revolutionary masses, causing dissatisfaction among the masses of the whole county and low morale among cadres; the face of the whole county was lifeless. At this time, Comrade Xie Weijun, who worked in the Red Army, was in Ruijin, and Comrade Yu Zehong and others from Shanghai also arrived in Ruijin. Everyone discussed and recommended me to serve as the Ruijin County Party Secretary (at that time there was no connection with the higher levels). Xie, Yu, and others helped me do a period of work. We rapidly punished the counter-revolutionary elements, rehabilitated the wronged cadres, and held a County Soviet Representative Congress. The cadres (almost all local peasant cadres) and masses became active, and the situation in the whole county changed greatly (the key lay in having a large batch of local cadres connected with the masses). After the third "encirclement and suppression" was smashed, a victory celebration rally of tens of thousands of people was held, and the enthusiasm was very high.
I served as Ruijin County Party Secretary for over a year. Around the winter of 1932, I was transferred by the Provincial Committee (the Secretary was Comrade Li Fuchun) to be the Secretary of the Huichang Center County Committee, leading the work of Huichang, Xunwu, and Anyuan counties. These three counties were border areas of the Central Soviet Area; the Red-White confrontation was fierce. Our own armed forces consisted only of independent battalions of a hundred or so men in each county. The people’s armed forces (Red Guards) had very few guns. Due to "Leftist" economic policies, most shops were closed, and finances and the economy were also very difficult. I worked in Huichang for a little over half a year and failed to open up the situation. Shortly after Bogu’s provisional Central Committee entered the Central Soviet Area, around March or April of 1933, I was transferred from this job to the Jiangxi Provincial Committee to be the Propaganda Minister for a month or two. Immediately following this, the provisional Central Committee launched the struggle against the "Jiangxi Luo Ming Line" represented by Deng (Xiaoping), Mao (Zetan), Xie (Weijun), and Gu (Bo). After the struggle, my post as Provincial Propaganda Minister was revoked, I was given a "final serious warning" disciplinary action, and I was sent to Nancun District in Le'an County to serve as an inspector. Less than ten days after arriving in Le'an, I was ordered to return to the Provincial Committee (it was said that Le'an was a border area and they feared problems might arise). Shortly after, I was transferred to the General Political Department to serve as Secretary-General. At the time, the Director of the General Political Department was Wang Jiaxiang, and the Deputy Director was He Chang. After serving as Secretary-General for two or three months, I requested a transfer to other work, so I was assigned as a clerk in the Propaganda Department of the General Political Department. Besides general propaganda work, I also served as chief editor of the General Political Department’s organ newspaper "Red Star" (a tabloid). I held this job all the way until the eve of the Zunyi Conference during the Long March.
Working in Taihang Period
Around 1940, we encountered two problems: one was the anti-friction struggle against the Kuomintang diehards, and the other was the Hundred Regiments Offensive. At the time, Peng Dehuai pursued the Wang Ming Line and told us that in the anti-friction struggle, we should avoid giving friction experts like Zhang Yinwu and Shi Yousan grounds to complain to Chiang Kai-shek as much as possible. For a very short time, I was influenced by this so-called "avoiding complaints" and failed to conduct the anti-friction struggle with a free hand. Although this did not influence our anti-stubborn struggle and anti-Japanese struggle much more than that, it cannot be said that I was not influenced by the Wang Ming Line pursued by Peng Dehuai.
Regarding the Hundred Regiments Offensive, I did not know at the time that it had not been agreed upon by the Central Military Commission and the Chairman, nor did I ask. Instead, I resolutely executed Peng Dehuai’s orders, executing an erroneous line (I did not understand at the time that this was a line error). Subsequently, I praised the Hundred Regiments Offensive in articles I wrote, which was also very wrong. Around the spring of 1943, at a cadre meeting held by the Taihang Sub-bureau, Peng Dehuai arrived and spoke a lot of fallacies—that set of his so-called bourgeois democratic views of equality, liberty, and fraternity. His tone was also lecturing, criticizing this and that, which aroused rebuttals from others present, especially Bo Yibo and others. The debate between the two sides was very intense. At the time, I disagreed with Peng Dehuai’s set of views, but I also disapproved of many of the views of Bo Yibo and others. As Secretary of the Sub-bureau, when making the conclusion, I adopted a completely eclectic stance, avoiding touching upon the dispute between the two sides, and only spoke positively about building the Party, building government, mass work, and struggle against the enemy in the base area. The Great Leader Chairman Mao teaches that "Eclecticism is Opportunism." Looking back (I did not realize this in the past), this was a major error of a political nature. In May or June of 1945, after I arrived in Yan'an, I reported the situation of this meeting to the Chairman and submitted the original text of my conclusion at that meeting to him.
Working in Beijing Period
After I arrived in Beijing to work in 1952, and especially during the ten years after being elected General Secretary by the "8th Party Congress," the proletarian things in my mind became fewer and fewer, and bourgeois things became more and more numerous. From quantitative change to qualitative change, it developed all the way to pushing a bourgeois reactionary line, turning me into one of the biggest capitalist roaders within the Party. In 1955, Liu Shaoqi chopped down more than 200,000 cooperatives. According to revelations, I was also one of the participants. I was not in charge of rural work at the time, and I cannot remember what I said during the discussion, but ideologically, I did have the thought that agricultural cooperatives were developing too fast and I feared they were not consolidated.
When preparing for the Party’s "8th Congress," I was designated to preside over the revision of the Party Constitution. In the revised Party Constitution, the content regarding Mao Zedong Thought as the Party’s guiding ideology, which was in the "7th Congress" Party Constitution, was deleted. Although this major principle issue was not proposed by me, I was in favor of it. This crime of mine brought extremely great damage to the Party and the people, and to the socialist cause. At the "8th Congress," in the Report on the Revision of the Party Constitution that I made on behalf of the Central Committee, I erroneously evaluated the role of the 20th Congress of the CPSU and erroneously mentioned the issue of opposing the cult of personality. This report was drafted collectively by several people, and this section was not written by me—I seem to remember it was written with reference to "On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat"—but as the person presiding over the drafting, I must bear the unshirkable main responsibility. This was an error of losing one's principled stance.
When considering candidates for the Central Committee of the "8th Congress," regarding the question of whether people who had engaged in traitorous behavior in the past but had performed well in long-term work since could serve as Central Committee members, I thought at the time that certain people could be treated as special cases and nominated as candidates for the Central Committee. Subsequently, An Ziwen and others drafted a document. This document completely violated the Party’s organizational principles and was extremely erroneous; it opened the door wide for some people to sneak into the Party’s leadership organs at various levels. I was an important person responsible for preparing the "8th Congress," and I was in favor of this document, so I should bear serious responsibility. Recalling that after the Japanese surrender, Bo Yibo and I violated the Party’s organizational principles by introducing the traitor Liu Daifeng into the Party—although this matter was approved by superiors organizationally—looking back, it was a political error of the same nature as the above problem. This directly violated the clear principle stipulated by the Chairman in his December 1940 instruction "On Policy": "Regarding traitors... if they can return to the revolution, they may be received, but they are not permitted to rejoin the Party."
During the ten years I served as General Secretary, my most fundamental and serious crime was not highlighting proletarian politics, not propagating Mao Zedong Thought, and for a long time not recognizing the great significance of Mao Zedong Thought in the domestic and international revolution. I did not study seriously or propagate seriously, and I even said things like "don't simplify" the propagation of Mao Zedong Thought. In 1958, when the People's Communes were realized, I was indeed happy. But in my thinking, from then on, the view that class struggle was weakening grew. Therefore, for a long period afterward, I was always relatively Rightist in handling class struggle issues, whether in the struggle between two lines and two roads or in inner-Party struggle (the reflection of class struggle within the Party). In 1961, I participated in formulating the "70 Articles for Industry (Draft)." This document did not emphasize politics in command—that is, Mao Zedong Thought in command—and contained many serious erroneous things. I must bear the main responsibility for this.
In 1962, when the "going it alone" wind was blowing, I approved of Anhui practicing "fixing output quotas for each household" (bao chan dao hu). This was a criminal proposition to destroy the socialist collective economy and actually engage in "going it alone." I said extremely erroneous things like "Yellow cat, black cat, as long as it catches mice, it is a good cat." In those years, there were also errors of high estimation of output and high procurement requisitions; I participated in determining the procurement tasks every year. Regarding capital construction projects, some that should not have been cut were cut. As General Secretary, I bear more responsibility for these errors. The Socialist Education Movement that began in 1963 had the "First Ten Articles" personally presided over and formulated by the Chairman. It clearly took class struggle and the struggle between two roads as the key link, stipulating a set of complete and correct theories, guidelines, policies, and methods. There was absolutely no need to create a "Second Ten Articles." The "Second Ten Articles" were completely wrong. I participated when this document was being worked on in Hangzhou, and I should fully bear heavy responsibility for the errors of this document.
I presided over the work of the Secretariat for ten years without systematically summarizing problems and raising problems to report and ask for instructions from Chairman Mao. This is absolutely impermissible organizationally and was the error of running an "independent kingdom." In early 1965, the Great Leader Chairman Mao criticized me as being an independent kingdom. I comforted myself at the time by saying I was not a person who usurped power; this was extremely erroneous. Recently I realized that an independent kingdom cannot be without political and ideological content; it cannot be merely a problem of work methods. Since it is an independent kingdom, it can only be a kingdom of the bourgeois headquarters. Members of the Secretariat, successively including Peng Zhen, Huang Kecheng, Luo Ruiqing, Lu Dingyi, Yang Shangkun, and many others, had problems. This is closely related to my error of not highlighting proletarian politics and not highlighting Mao Zedong Thought for a long time. As a result, I myself finally degenerated into the ranks of these revisionists. Within the Secretariat, I trusted Peng Zhen overly much and handed many matters to him to handle. Regarding Yang Shangkun installing listening devices, I handled it neither consistently nor seriously; for this, I should bear serious political responsibility. In handling the struggle against Luo Ruiqing, I similarly committed an intolerable, serious error. Massive facts show that at every important juncture, in the struggle between two classes, two roads, and two lines, I did not stand on the side of the proletariat but on the side of the bourgeoisie; not on the side of Chairman Mao’s proletarian revolutionary line and the socialist road, but on the side of the bourgeois line and the capitalist road.
At the beginning of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, I, together with Liu Shaoqi, proposed a bourgeois reactionary line to strike the revolutionary masses, strike the revolutionary Left, strangle the mass movement, and strangle the Cultural Revolution. After Chairman Mao’s big-character poster "Bombard the Headquarters" came out, I began to feel the seriousness of my own problems. Subsequently, the revolutionary masses revealed a large amount of my errors and crimes over many years in various aspects, which made me wake up step by step. I sincerely and unreservedly accept the criticism and accusations of the Party and the revolutionary masses against me. When I think of the damage my errors and crimes have brought to the revolution, I truly feel a mixture of shame and regret, and I am too ashamed to show my face. I fully support using a person like me as a negative teacher to conduct persistent and deep criticism, to eliminate the poison and influence I have spread over many years. For me personally, the Cultural Revolution has also saved me, keeping me from falling into an even more sinful abyss.
I have been in the Party for more than forty years. Because my bourgeois worldview was not remolded, I eventually degenerated into the biggest capitalist roader within the Party. The massive facts revealed by the revolutionary masses have enabled me to pick up a mirror again to recognize my true face. I have completely failed the trust and expectations the Party and Chairman Mao have held for me for a long time. With a heavy heart, I review my past. I am willing, in my remaining years, to repent and make a fresh start, to become a new person, and to strive to use Mao Zedong Thought to remold my bourgeois worldview. For a person like me, no punishment is excessive. I guarantee never to reverse the verdict, and I absolutely do not wish to be a capitalist roader who refuses to repent until death. My greatest hope is to be able to remain in the Party and I request the Party to assign me a tiny job when possible, giving me a chance to make up for my faults and turn over a new leaf. I enthusiastically hail the great victory of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.
Original Source: Shen Du Dang Bao (Deep Read Party Newspaper)